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Abstract
The evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks is arousing increasing concern based on
the fact thatmore andmore complex systems in the real-world have been proven to be organized in
the formofmulti-layer networks rather than single-layer networks. In this study, we examine the
effects of self-organized interdependence on the evolution and stabilization of cooperationwith social
dilemmas depicted by the Prisoner’s DilemmaGame (PDG) and the Public GoodsGame (PGG) in
which agents with themost common strategy have the chance to be rewarded proportionally to the
fitness of corresponding agents belonging to the other network.We show that such a type-free
rewarding rule, independent of game strategy, establishes a time-varying interdependence between
two initially independent populationswhereby cooperation is highly promoted aswell as stabilized
both in the two-player PDG and in themulti-player PGG.Majority-pressure based interdependence
at stake has proven pretty neutral in regard to game strategy because it is contingent on strategy
configuration rather than strategy itself, which thus gives birth to homologous communities,
including cooperative as well as non-cooperative, and thereby an enhanced spatial reciprocity between
non-identical networks is triggered. Of particular interest is the double-edged sword effect of network
interdependence on cooperation although inmost instances the heavier the interdependence, the
better the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, interpretations of the nontrivial relationship
between cooperation and benchmark thresholdmeasuring the strategy’s local popularity highlight
that rewarding theminimummajority is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in such scenario.
Finally, we claim our observations are also quite robust with respect tomutation.
1. Introduction
In accordancewith theoretical predictions by the theory of survival offittest, selfish defection should have been
the only outcome of natural selection considering that cooperators always benefit their opponents at a cost to
themselves, which stands in sharp contrast to realistic observations emphasizing cooperation is ubiquitous [1]
and also builds up a dilemmawhere individual optimization does not lead to a social optimum [2]. It remains
largely unclear hownon-selfish or costly cooperative behavior survives and also expands territories although
such altruistic activity hasmade substantial contribution to the evolution of human aswell as animal society
[3–6]. In order to explore principles and explanations lurking beneath this puzzle, scientists resort to
evolutionary game theory that creatively introduces the notion of evolution into solutions to aforementioned
social dilemmas and has indisputably become one of themost powerful and commonly utilized tools [7, 8].
As a discipline closely related to evolutionary game theory, network science has amazingly penetrated into
various realms due to growing dependence ofmodern society on the intricate web of critical infrastructure
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spatial games concerning structured populations also have attracted considerable attention in the past few
decades [21–40]. And network reciprocity, inspired by the seminal work ofNowak et al [41], has long since been
regarded as amost well-knownmechanism to encourage the evolution of cooperation, which probably signifies
network structure indeed has a talent for boosting cooperation bymeans of insulating cooperators from
exploitation by noncooperators.Most of the studies in this area have beenwell consideredwith the application
of single-layer networks.
Ourmotivation in this paper comesmainly from the following two aspects. On the one hand, despite the
widespread application of single-layermodels, issues concerningmulti-layer topologies are capturing the
current interest of scientists in the light of the fact thatmany a real system is best described bymulti-layer or
multi-domain structure rather than by single-layer structure [42–55], amongwhich how to build up proper
interdependent relationship between different networks remains of great interest and significance [56–81]. On
the other side of the coin, it is reported in real experiments that individuals are readily confrontedwith
challenges, in the decision-making procedure, from group pressure exactly established by unanimousmajority,
which generally leads to the significant distortion of perception, judgment aswell as action [82, 83]. Aside from
this real observation, it is often the case that conforming to themajority is able to guarantee cooperation a
promising evolutionary fate [84–87]. From a psychological perspective, it is often the case in reality that being
majority can give agents a certain sense of belonging andmake thembecomemore confident in their behavior
and strategic choices. Thesematerials, therefore,might highlight a fact that once agents are arranged tomake
decisions in grouped patterns, themajority of the population or the groupwho are carryingmost common
strategy (MCS), could possibly have a certain number of advantages (including but not limited to psychological)
in terms of strategy-spreading and opinion-conveying, nomatter whether or not they are really doing right.
However, it remains unclear how to quantify this widespread social phenomenon in networked systems, as well
as what role suchmajority-pressuremight play in the evolution of strategy and also in the establishment of
network interdependence. As a possible solution to these problems, in this studywe associate the perceived
advantage of beingmajority with the evolutionary fitness of corresponding agents on the other network and
obtain a robust self-organized intercorrelation between two initially independent lattices. Specifically, if the
strategy popularity of an agent exceeds the benchmark threshold (nomatter she is a cooperator or defector), she
is likely to be rewarded proportionally to thefitness of the homologous agent on the other network.Majority-
pressure based interdependence at stake doesmatter strategy’s local configuration rather than strategy itself.
From this point of view, such type-free interdependence has no declared or intentional bias in terms of treating
non-identical social behavior. Not only can it benefit cooperation, it can also help defection. And it creates
homologous or co-evolving communities including cooperative and defective on two networks in the evolution,
however, we elucidate that inmost cases only the cooperative community is favored by selection and is
consistent with the prevalence of cooperation. Furthermore, by comparison, we demonstrate that rewarding the
minimummajority is always able to induce optimal promotion aswell as stabilization of cooperation both in the
two-player PDG and in themulti-player PGG.
The rest of this study is arranged as follows.Wefirst present the PDG andPGGon interdependent networks.
Then, we shall report the primary results in the second section. Finally, we show relevant discussion extracted
from this work.
2. The evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks
The population is structured by two L×L square lattices, termedA andB, with vonNeumann neighborhood
and periodic boundary conditions.N denotes the population size, andN=NA+NB, whereNA represents the
size ofA,NB the size ofB, respectively. Each agent is initially designated either as a cooperator (C) or a defector
(D)with equal probability. For the PDG, each game involves three possible pairwise interactions such asmutual
cooperation yielding the reward R, mutual defection leading to the punishment P , andmixed choice endowing
the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation T . The payoffmatrixmapping agents’
interactions is given by:









where = = = =R T b S P1, , 0, constituting aweak Prisoner’sDilemma [41]. b is the dilemma strength,
such that increasing b implies a stronger attraction into a full-D phase.
Then for the PGG, each agent launches a PGG involving all her direct partners and herself. During this
process, the cooperator contributes a constant amount =c 1 to the commonpool, and the defector contributes
nothing. The total contributions will bemultiplied by a synergy factor ò and allocated evenly among all
2
New J. Phys. 20 (2018) 083047 ZYang et al
participants irrespective of their contributions. Accordingly, each participant receives a payoff given by the
following expression:
ådP = * - Î W ( )s s i j; , 2i j i X X iX X X X
where d =
+k 1iX
is the normalized enhancement factor. kiX and WiX characterize the degree and neighborhoods
of agent i on the networkX, respectively. Î { }C Ds ,iX represents the strategy of agent iX, and =s 1iX (0) if iX is a
cooperator (defector).
We stimulate the evolutionary process on both networks in accordance with the standardMonte Carlo
simulations procedure comprising the following elementary steps. First, each agent plays the PDGor PGGwith
all direct neighbors and calculates the payoffPiX .
Next, testingwhether an agent’s strategy is aMCSwith theHeaviside step function
f = Q - =











where nsiX denotes the number of agents adopting strategy siX within iXʼs neighborhoods. Î +{ }M k1, ..., 1iX
serves as the benchmark that defines aMCS and quantifies the local popularity of strategies. Intuitively, itmeans
siX is aMCSonly provided that f = 1iX , and vice versa.
In order to quantifymajority-effect emerging in human society and also to link it with the interdependence
of networks, we assume that if iX adopts aMCS she is going to be rewardedwith an extra payoff proportional to
the payoff of the corresponding (homologous) agent *iX on the other networkwith the probability g Î [ ]0, 1 . In
this case, the final utility of iX should be rewritten as
*a= P + P ( )U , 4i i iX X X
whereα quantifies coupling strength imposed by the homologous agent of the other network and the ingredient
*aPiX stresses agents’ perceived advantage of beingmajority. It is worth noting that in this report rewarding is
undirected in terms of layers unlike in [61], and also thatwhether or not the rewarding event occurs is exactly
determined both by the parameter γ and the aboveHeaviside step function.
Lastly, each agent updates strategy by learning a randomly drawnneighbor’s strategy with the probability













whereK quantifies the uncertainty or noise related to the strategy transmission [21] and provides ameasure of
the strength of natural selection. AllMonte Carlo simulations are performed for sufficiently long time steps and
we average the final results over up to 100 independent runs.
3. Results
In this study, cross-network rewarding probability, fitness-coupling intensity, and togetherwith benchmark
threshold testingMCS constitute the primary determinants determining interdependence between different
evolutionary dynamics proceeding on non-identical networks. Thus our analysis is conductedmainly
surrounding these three parts. First, we beginwith checking the impact that γ imposes on the evolution race
between cooperators and noncooperators. Figure 1 reveals that interdependence, catalyzed by type-free (i.e.,
regardless of cooperative or non-cooperative) supporting for theMCS, is strikingly prone to pave theway for
cooperation to prevail on interdependent networks. Of significance is double-sided effect of cross-network
rewarding probability, γ, on cooperative behavior. That is, in spite of itsmost common enhancement effect on
cooperation compared to the situationwithout interdependence (see γ=0 infigure 1), there does exist an
opposite and long-term inhibition (e.g., refer to γ=0.2 infigure 1). By comparison, it is easy tofindwhen
γ=0.2 cooperation is always inhibited for the PDG infigure 1(a), and similarly for scenarios with small synergy
factors in the PGG (refer tofigure 1(b)). The outcome outlines aminimumcross-network rewarding frequency
is potentially needed for facilitation of cooperation in the two-player PDG and also in themulti-player PGG
taking place on intercorrelated networks.
Different from the complicated relationship between γ and cooperation, the influence offitness-coupling
intensity seemsmuch clearer as depicted infigure 2. Typically, cooperation is substantially impelled compared
with the case withoutfitness entanglement (i.e., the curveα=0 infigure 2) and it demonstrates an increasing
improvement of cooperationwith amonotonous rise ofα, nomatter in the PDGor in the PGG. This
observationmeans a heavy inter reliance on evolutionary fitness of homologous pairs ismore apt to favor non-
selfish cooperators rather than thosewho fail to cooperate. Critical thresholds of b in the PDGbeyondwhich the
full cooperation phase and cooperation phenomenon vanish are highly enlarged asα creeps up (see figure 2(a)).
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With regard to the PGG, in turn, cut-offs of δmarking analogous key points of dynamics are also remarkably
minified in regard to the same upward trend ofα (checkfigure 2(b)). These traitsmanifest that entangling
evolutionaryfitness of different layers is probably capable of inspiring cooperation against selfish
noncooperation.
It is worth pointing out that type-free rewarding here in fact nourishes threewell-known ingredients such as
pro-social [88], anti-social [89], and as well as neutral reward [90] in accordancewith differences in strategic
actions of the target agents. Aswemainly focus on the differences that cross-layer rewarding brings about at the
level of strategy pair rather than a single strategy on two networks, thuswemake the following assumption. Pro-
social (anti-social) reward describes the case rewarding a pair of cooperators (defectors), i.e., rewarding helps
cooperation (defection). It is very easy to understand both pro-social and anti-social rewarding. However,
neutral reward in this study refers to rewarding a pair withinwhich one is a cooperator (defector) and the other
should always be a defector (cooperator) from the other network. Itmeans that neutral reward simultaneously
helps cooperation and defection so that rewarding is unbiased at the level of game strategy. Figure 3 pictures the
time course of fraction of cooperation (left panel) as well as abundance of type-free reward (right panel) in the
PDG. Pro-social, anti-social, and neutral reward are simultaneously observed in one complete evolutionary
course. Quite interestingly, the plot also gives prominence to the fact that an evolutionary race should not only
be a tournament between different strategies but also be a competition for different sorts of rewarding in this
work.More importantly, thewar of strategies and the combat concerning rewardmostly co-exist until the
systemultimately converges to a strategic consensus state. It illustrates that, at the very beginning, random
initialization incurs a sharp drop in the frequency of cooperators. In fact, once for awhile there are less than 0.73
(close to extinction) percent of cooperators in the entire population (check the left panel infigure 3). This
Figure 1.Prevalence of cooperation in the PDG (a) and PGG (b) stimulated by cross-layer rewarding probability γ according towhich
the resulting interdependence between different networks is accuratelymodulated. The plot stresses a very close and sometimes
complicated relationship between γ and its influence on cooperation. That is, neither can inhibition be ignored although inmost cases
it seems that themore frequent the cross-layer rewarding, the better the evolution of cooperation.NA=NB=10 000, L=100,
K=0.1,α=1,M=3.
Figure 2.Monotonous promotion effect on cooperation byfitness-coupling strengthα in the PDG (a) aswell as PGG (b). Remarkably,
it depicts an extraordinary increase in cooperation level with the growth ofα bywhich evolutionaryfitness is intercorrelated between
non-identical layers.NA=NB=10 000, L=100,K=0.1, γ=1,M=3.
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induces and also exacerbatesmounting imbalance among three incentives. Asmost cooperators die out fast in
this stage, the abundance of pro-social and neutral reward rapidly decreases and their curves exhibit almost the
same slopewithin this time frame (refer to the first half of the curve infigure 3). As a consequence, it fuels an
apparent growth of anti-social rewarding.
In fact,majority-pressure based interdependence in this study is pretty neutral in terms of game strategy
because it is contingent on strategy configuration rather than on strategy itself. It thus helps both cooperation
and defection simultaneously. The rapid spreading of defection at the beginning offigure 4 has verified this point
and countless defective co-evolving communities are forming on two networks. Ironically, the climb of
defection level, in turn, harms thewelfare of defectors. Themain reason for this probably lies in the following
two aspects. On the one hand, the increase of proportion of defective neighbors oftenweakens defector’s
superiority infitness just as the payoffmatrix indicates. On the other hand, for defectors the extra fitness
imposed bymajority-effect is also supposed to decline as a defector embraced by other defectors usually gains
nothing from and contributes nothing to their homologous defectors on the other network.Quite crucially,
however, for cooperators the opposite is often the case with respect to above two key points. Finally, a very small
number of cooperative survivors struggle to succeed in forming homologous communities that co-evolve with
each other on two layers (see clusters outspreadingwithin the circled area infigure 4). Once these allied
communities emerge bymeans of self-organization they are going to be guaranteed to become pretty robust in
linewith the above analysis. Inmost cases they are fed not only by neighboring cooperators on their own
network, but also by homologous cooperators on the other interdependent network. The spatial reciprocity
reported in [41] has therefore been heavily amplified. Then after a long depression, cooperation begins to revive
Figure 3.Time process of fraction of cooperation and abundance of type-free rewarding including pro-social, anti-social, and neutral
reward in the PDGon two lattices. It is worth pointing out that pro-social, anti-social and neutral rewarding are considered in terms of
strategy pair rather than a single strategy.We find it is often the case that the war of strategy is also the competition of rewarding in this
study, and these two evolutionary races usually co-exist with each other until the systemultimately resides in an equilibrium state,
insinuating theirmutual influences on each other.NA=NB=10 000, L=100,K=0.1,α=1, γ=0.8,M=3, b=1.2.
Figure 4. Snapshot illustrates the aforementioned type-free rewarding yields homologous communities amongwhich some are
cooperative yet others are defective. Cooperators (blue), defectors (red), rewarded cooperators (olive), and rewarded defectors
(orange) in the PDGon two lattices. It is reflected that cooperators composing homologous communities are often nurtured not only
by cooperators who surround thembut also by corresponding cooperators on the other network, which induces an enhanced spatial
reciprocity and greatly helps to stabilize the evolution of cooperation. The outcome shows that only cooperative communities are
finally favored by selection.NA=NB=10 000, L=100,K=0.1,α=1, γ=0.8,M=3, b=1.2.
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with the aid of such improved reciprocity and to enlarge territories bymeans of replacing noncooperators who
reside on the borders and sever as the boundary line bridging different communities infigure 4.Despite the fact
thatmajority-pressure driven interdependence helps cooperators (defectors) to form cooperative (defective) co-
evolving communities as shown infigure 4, the outcome stresses natural selection often favors the cooperative
co-evolving community.
As regards how to define aMCS, different peoplemight have different opinions.Without loss of generosity,
we therefore employ a benchmarkM to quantify the local popularity of agents’ strategies. In this way, for a given
agent if the number of her neighbors who adopt the same strategy with her exceedsM, then her strategy is
identified as aMCS, and vice versa.We carry out a throughout study on influences ofM as shown infigure 5
although in realitymajority rule generally corresponds to the situations thatmeet requirements Î ZM and
 + ¯¯ M kk 1
2
, where Z represents the integer set and k̄ is the average degree of two interdependent networks.
Atfirst glance, what catches our eyes is the different impacts of dynamics in the PDGandPGG. For instance,
unlike the obstructive effect upon cooperation in the PDG,we insteadwitness a slight facilitation of cooperative
behavior in the PGGwhenM=4 (checkfigures 5(a) and (b)). In addition, it suggests there exists an optimal
benchmark thresholdMopt, at which cooperation ismaximally boosted. That is = + =
¯
M 1 3kopt 2 for both
types of interactions (see figures 5(a) and (b)). Furthermore, we have verified such relationship betweenMopt
and k̄ also applies to the casewith the application ofMoore neighborhood infigures 5(c) and (d), i.e.,
= + =
¯
M 1 5kopt 2 in this situation. Amazingly, promotion effect on cooperationwithMoore neighborhood, in
fact, appears even far stronger than that for vonNeumann neighborhood in thisfigure. This phenomenon
differs apparently fromprevious observations concerning dynamically organized partnerships [91–94] and also
yeast societies [95], where authors argue that denser networks often exhibit apparent propensity to deter the
establishment of cooperation. The existence ofMopt emphasizes that rewarding agents whose strategy popularity
slightly oversteps half size of their neighborhoods (referred to as theminimummajority)most benefits the
evolution of cooperation nomatter inwhich kind of games. Any departure from thisMopt will definitely cause a
quick decline in cooperation level. The outcome not only enriches our comprehension about the role of network
Figure 5.Optimal benchmark threshold for enhancing cooperation both in the PDG (a) and in the PGG (b)with the presence of von
Neumann neighborhood.M=Inf refers to the scenario without cross-network rewarding.More precisely, the optimalMopt exactly
satisfies = +
¯
M 1kopt 2 both for vonNeumann andMoore neighborhood in the PDG (c) and PGG (d), where k̄ is the average degree
of networks. Compared to vonNeumann neighborhood, as amatter of fact, we even find critical threshold points symbolizing
emergence of full cooperation phases aswell as cooperation itself are all remarkably optimized (see (c) and (d)), implying amuch
stronger promotion on cooperationwith respect toMoore neighborhood.NA=NB=10 000, L=100,K=0.1,α=1, γ=1.
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density in the evolution of cooperation but also delivers very impressively an inspiration to us that rewarding the
minimummajority is probably consistent with the prevalence of pro-social behavior in such scenario.
In view of non-negligible effect of spatial patterns to our co-evolutionary protocol, we finally examine the
robustness of the designedmechanism in regard tomutation asmutation itself is always able to disorder the
microscopic spatial distribution of strategy. Herewe embed amutation bywhich their strategies are randomly
reassignedwith a non-zero probability ζwhen agents plan to update strategies. The related outcome presented
infigure 6 shows that the introduction ofmutation does not qualitatively change our results apart from some
almost negligible fluctuations in cooperation level. Furthermore, the stabilization of cooperation, generally
investigatingwhat causes the collapse of cooperation, is considered asmuch crucial as its emergence.We study
this issue infigure 7 by seeding at randoma pair of coordinatedmonomers (first column), two-tuples (second
column), and triads (third column) comprising solely defectors on two interdependent lattices, respectively,
with the rest being cooperators. They are three representative invasions and others can be realized by their rich
combinations. It has been reported that in such configurations (often referred as noncooperation’s Paradise) the
Figure 6.Robustness of enhancement effect on cooperationwith respect tomutation. It demonstrates that embeddingmutation does
not qualitatively change the results we have obtained but does brings about some slightfluctuations in cooperation level. By theway,
this robustness is always believed to be probably very crucial for the stabilization of cooperation as it reveals, to some extent, a certain
amount of resistance fromdynamics and targeted at sudden variations in the temporary distribution of strategy.NA=NB=10 000,
L=100,K=0.1,α=1, γ=1,M=3, ζ=5×10−3.
Figure 7.Residing frequency corresponding to full cooperation, full defection and themixed state, respectively, in dependence on non-
identical invadingmeans by various non-cooperative homologous components such asmonomers (a1), (b1), two-tuples (a2), (b2),
and triads (a3), (b3) for γ=1 (a1)–(a3) and for γ=0.5 (b1)–(b3) in the PDG.NA=NB=10 000, L=100,K=0.1,α=1,
M=3. The final results are obtained by averaging 500 independent runs.
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evolution of cooperation is supposed to be highly challenged [96], thus testing anti-invasion stability of
cooperation against defection in such circumstance ismore convincing. Under the conditions shown infigure 7,
wefind each subsystem (i.e., corresponds to each lattice) always settles in absorbing states where each
subpopulation is taken over by only one type of strategies, i.e., C or D. Consequently, the ultimate states of the
whole system can be accurately categorized into full cooperation, full defection, as well as themixed statewhere one
layer is full cooperation and simultaneously the other is full defection. Andwe count the frequency bywhich the
system resides in each state. Asfigures 7(a1)–(a3) shows, notably, with respect to γ=1 cooperation has even
been often stabilized by a probability over 62% for themaximum b=2 (an extremely harsh environment for
cooperation). And it statistically explainsmajority-pressure driven interdependence inmost circumstances is
readily to stabilize the evolution of cooperation. Uncommonly, for b 1.85, defection always fails to invade in
this condition. Although the challenge for stabilization of cooperation surges with the growth of b in this period,
themixed phase has taken over almost half of experiments inwhich the phase full cooperation fails tomaintain
just as this plot displays, that is, corresponding to b>1.85 curves for themixed equilibrium and full defection
nearly coincide with each other (refer tofigures 7(a1)–(a3)). As γdecreases, yet, themaintenance of cooperation
begins to becomemore difficult (checkfigures 7(b1)–(b3)). These details thus spotlight no doubt the notable
capability and high efficiency of newly designed co-evolutionmechanism in stabilizing the evolution of
cooperation. In general, the higher the chance of rewarding, the stronger this capability as well as efficiency.
4.Discussion
In human society, it has been reported in real experiments that inmany circumstances people are often
confrontedwithmajority-pressure when theymake decisions or express opinions [82, 83]. In view of its
importance for the evolution of human behavior, we here investigate the evolution of cooperationwith social
dilemmas comprising the PDG andPGG, inwhich on the basis of suchmajority-pressure ormajority-effect a
self-organized interdependence of non-identical networks is well established bymeans of type-free cross-
network rewarding.We demonstrate that suchwidespreadmajority-pressure phenomenon has a profound
impact on the emergence aswell asmaintenance of cooperation.
Agents with theMCS are endowedwith the chance to be rewarded by an extra payoff related to the
evolutionaryfitness of homologous agents (also called corresponding agents in other studies) on the other
network. In this study, such type-free cross-network rewarding always depends exactly on strategy’s spatial
distribution rather than on strategy itself, so it is therefore obviously unbiased at the level of game strategy. In
view of this point, it is not only beneficial to cooperation but also conducive to defection, thus it often leads to
emergence of countless co-evolving (homologous) communities amongwhich some are cooperative and others
are defective.What’smore important is, however, inmost instances only cooperative co-evolving communities
are favored by natural selection and are consistent with the prevalence of cooperation. In accordance with
specific strategies of the target agents, incentives such as pro-social [88], anti-social [89], and neutral rewarding
[90] simultaneously emerge and compete with each other during the evolution. As a consequence, in this work
the evolution of strategies, in fact, is often a race among positive, negative, and neutral incentives.
We have also shown thatmajority-pressure driven interdependence is highly capable of triggering the
optimal promotion of cooperation and stabilizing cooperation provided that frequent cross-network rewarding
aswell as heavyfitness entanglement between homologous agents of intercorrelated layers is possible. This,
togetherwith the negative effect of small cross-network rewarding probability, constitutes a double-edged
sword for cooperative behavior. Bridgingmajority-pressure ormajority-effect with cross-network rewarding
not only establishes an adaptive interdependence between non-identical networks, but also introduces diversity
into network interdependence at stake. Rewarding agents who carryMCS, to some extent, captures the nature of
real-life interactions and often enables a robust interdependence between two initially independent networks.
The optimal benchmark threshold exhibits, quite interestingly, a distinctive relationshipwith connection
density of the network, that is = +
¯
M 1kopt 2 in this context, which signifies rewarding theminimummajority is
best for the evolution of cooperation. Considering thatM characterizes the degree towhich two networks
interdepend on each other, thus the existence ofMopt reflects indirectly a fact that there often exists an optimal
network interdependence for the evolution of altruistic cooperation in such scenario, which is generally
consistent with themain results reported by previous studies [60–62].
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